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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Constitution article VIII, section 4, which provides that "The Supreme Court by rule
shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the
conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law."
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
I.

Whether the district court erred when it imposed a three-year

suspension upon the Respondent, Jonathan W. Grimes, but then stayed all but 181
days, when the court found that the attorney had knowledge that a client's funds
were not properly safeguarded and used for the lawyer's own purposes before they
were earned. The standard of review for sanctions imposed for professional
misconduct in attorney discipline actions is a correctness standard, but the Utah
Supreme Court may make an independent judgment regarding the appropriate
level of discipline if the evidence warrants it. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207
(Utah 1997). This issue was preserved through closing argument and through the
Sanctions Hearing Brief submitted to the district court. [R. 351 at 109, R. 278297]
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following rules are fully set forth in the Addendum to Brief of
Petitioner, submitted herewith:
Rule 1.2 (Scope of Representation), Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.3 (Diligence), Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.4 (Communication), Rules of Professional Conduct

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
l may contain errors.

Rule 1.5 (Fees), Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 8.4 (Misconduct), Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 14-603 Sanction, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
Rule 14-604 Factors to be Considered in Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
Rule 14-605 Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions.
Rule 14-607 Aggravation and Mitigation, Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: This is an attorney discipline case. The district court
suspended the Respondent, Jonathan W. Grimes ("Grimes"), under circumstances
in which he should have been disbarred. The Utah State Bar's Office of
Professional Conduct ("OPC") appeals the district court's decision, and urges the
Court to reverse it, and instead to enter an order of disbarment against Grimes.
The Course of Proceedings: The OPC filed a Complaint against Grimes
on June 20, 2008 [R. 1-10] On June 2, 2010, the district court presided over a trial
to determine whether Grimes violated the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules").
[R. 350] The district court found that Grimes violated Rule 1.2(a) (Scope of
Representation); 1.3 (Diligence); Rule 1.4(a) (Communication); Rule 1.5(a) (Fees);
Rules 8.4 (a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct), and issued Findings of Fact and
Conclusion of Law. [R. 211] The matter then proceeded to a sanctions hearing on
November 8, 2010. [R. 351]
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Disposition in the Trial Court: Following the sanctions hearing, the district
court entered an Order of Sanction against Grimes and suspended him from the
practice of law for a period of three years, with all but 181 days stayed. [R. 331-344]

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

Mr. Bill Riordan ("Riorden") hired Grimes in June 2005 to represent

him in a discrimination case. [R. 350 at 48]
2.

Riordan paid a $10,000 retainer. [Id. at 49] At the time, Grimes

worked for attorney J. Kent Holland. [Id. at 16] The retainer was placed in
Holland's attorney trust account. [Id.]
3.

Grimes left the Holland firm sometime in 2006 and took Riordan's

file and case with him.
4.

On June 9, 2006, Holland's secretary gave a check in the amount

of $7,070 to Grimes, representing that it was the remainder of Riordan's retainer.
[R. 350 at 89]
5.

Grimes failed to communicate with Mr. Riordan from approximately

January 2007 to December 2007. [R. 202]
6.

In March 2007, Riordan left numerous messages for Grimes, and

eventually talked to his secretary about the case. [Id.]
7.

On June 25, 2007, Riordan mailed Grimes a letter requesting

information about his case. Grimes did not respond. [Id.]
8.

On July 21, 2007, Riordan sent Grimes a certified letter. [Id.] That

letter was returned to Riordan in August 2007. [Id. at 203]
9.

Riordan continued trying to communicate with Grimes via telephone
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and fax, but was unsuccessful in getting a response. [Id.]
10.

Because Grimes failed to pursue Riordan's case, the case was

dismissed. [Id.]
11.

Grimes did not inform Riordan that the case had been dismissed.

12.

Grimes failed to return the unearned portion of the retainer, even

[Id.]

though Riordan asked repeatedly for the money to be returned. [Id.]
13.

On December 22, 2008, Riordan sent a letter to Grimes asking for

an accounting of his retainer and requesting the unused portion be sent to his
new attorney. [Id.]
14. The district court concluded that the above described conduct violated
the

following

Rules

of

Professional

Conduct:

Rule

1.2(a)

(Scope

of

Representation); 1.3 (Diligence); Rule 1.4(a) (Communication); Rule 1.5(a) (Fees);
and, Rules 8.4 (a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct). [R. 211]
15.

Following a sanctions hearing, the district court concluded that the

presumptive sanction for Grimes1 misconduct, under Rule 14-605 Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, was disbarment. [R. 341]
16.

Based upon the evidence presented at the sanctions hearing, the

district court found the following mitigating factors: 1) the absence of a record of
prior discipline; 2) inexperience in the practice of law; 3) personal and emotional
problems; 4) good character or reputation; 5) interim reform; and 6) remorse. [Id
at 339-341]
17.

The district court also found the following aggravating factors: 1)
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selfish or dishonest motive and 2) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of
the misconduct either to the client or to the disciplinary authority. [Id. at 337-338]
18.

Though the district court found that the presumptive sanction for

Grimes' misconduct was disbarment, it ruled that justice would be better served
in this case with a lesser sanction, and suspended Grimes from the practice of
law for three-years, with all but 181 days of the suspension stayed. [R. 341-342]
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court's decision to suspend Grimes, rather than disbar him, is
contrary to established law: Grimes should have been disbarred for his
misappropriation of a client's money. Based upon the evidence presented to the
district court, the presumptive sanction for Grimes' misconduct, according to the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and Utah case law, was disbarment.
The court correctly reached that conclusion, but then reduced the presumptive
sanction to a three-year suspension. The facts presented to the district court in
this case did not warrant the departure from the presumptive sanction, and the
OPC asks this Court to review the matter and enter an order of disbarment
against Grimes.
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court's Decision to Reduce the Presumptive Sanction of
Disbarment to a Lesser Sanction was Contrary to Established Law
Concerning Discipline in Misappropriation Cases
The correct presumptive sanction for Grimes' actions under the Standards

for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") is disbarment. Though a district
court is allowed flexibility in crafting attorney sanctions, when a case involves the
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misappropriation of client funds, only truly compelling mitigation can reduce the
sanction from disbarment. Grimes failed to offer truly compelling mitigation, and
the district court erred by reducing the disbarment to a three-year suspension.
A.
Based Upon the Facts Established in the Adjudication Hearing,
Grimes' Misconduct Constitutes a Presumptive Disbarment Case
Under the Standards
The presumptive sanction in this case is disbarment. This is dictated by
the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") and by case law in
this jurisdiction and most, if not all, other jurisdictions.
The Standards set forth presumptive sanctions for broad categories of
misconduct, absent the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Pursuant to the Standards disbarment is the presumptive sanction if the attorney:
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional conduct with
the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court,
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the
public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious
interference with a legal proceeding;
(a)(2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of
which includes intentional interference with the administration of
justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion,
misappropriation, or theft; . . .
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
See Rule 14-605, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
Grimes' misconduct, according to this Court's decisions in similar cases,
falls within the language of Rule 14-605(a)(1) and 14-605(a)(3). In In re Johnson,
this Court found that disbarment was the appropriate presumptive sanction under
both Rule 14-605(a)(1) and Rule 14-605(a)(c). In re Johnson, 48 P.3d 881 (Utah
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2001) This Court found that Johnson knowingly violated the Rules, with the intent
to benefit himself, and that his conduct caused serious or potentially serious
injury to the party, public or legal system. This Court made those findings based
upon Johnson's violations of Rules 1.15(a), 1.15(b) and 1.15(c) for his failure to
return funds to his client and his comingling of the funds, stating that "[t]he trial
court's finding that Johnson knowingly violated rule 1.15 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct for his own benefit was sufficient to support disbarment." In
re Johnson, 48 P.3d at 886. Violations of Rule 1.15 are not present in this case.
That, however, does not mean that the underlying misconduct is different than
the misbehavior this Court addressed in the Johnson case.
In Johnson, in addition to finding that disbarment was appropriate under
Rule 14-605(a)(1), this Court also found that disbarment was appropriate under
Rule 14-605(a)(3) because the Court held that misappropriation is intentional
conduct involving dishonesty that seriously reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice law. /of. at 881, 885. In other words, this Court found that
misappropriation was per se "intentional conduct involving dishonesty."
Johnson and the present case both present situations where an attorney
has misappropriated client funds. Johnson settled a case for his client. While he
initially put the money in trust, he then took the money out, and by the time the
client asked for the money had converted it for his own use. Johnson did not
return the money to his client and offered no satisfactory explanation for why he
kept the money.

Grimes' case is similar. Grimes was provided $7,070.00 in

unearned retained fees for his client, Riordan, when he stopped working with
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Holland. He knew that money was for Riordan's case, and he knew it wasn't
earned, but he took the money and used it for his own purposes.
Johnson asserted as a defense that there was a question of fact about
whether the client was entitled to the funds, /of. This Court found that even if it
accepted the fact that there was a dispute as to amount owed to the client,
Johnson had misappropriated the funds because he knew that he had not been
gifted the entire amount. In this case, Grimes committed misappropriation
because he knew that the funds he accepted belonged to Riordan, yet he failed
to keep them in trust or return them to his client upon request.
Other cases in Utah and in other jurisdictions hold that disbarment is the
appropriate sanction for misappropriation of client funds.
attorney

was

disbarred

misappropriating

the

for

funds

charging
from

his

substantial
client's

In In re Babilis, an

fees

for

estate,

little
and

work,
making

misrepresentations to the client and the probate court. In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207
(Utah

1997).

In

another

Utah

case,

an

attorney

was

disbarred

for

misappropriation with the Court stating that misappropriation of client funds,
alone, is enough to trigger disbarment without the cumulative effect of other
misconduct. In re Ennenga, 37 P.3d 1150 (Utah 2001). In Colorado, "when a
lawyer knowingly converts client funds, disbarment is 'virtually automatic,' at least
in the absence of significant factors in mitigation." People v. Young, 864 P.2d 563
(Colo. 1993). In another Colorado case an attorney was disbarred for two counts
of abandonment of clients and conversion of client funds. People v. Righter, 35
P.3d 159 (Colo. 1999).
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This Court has consistently found that misappropriate

?

client funds is

the most serious of all attorney misconduct, and is grounds for disbarment

mitigating factors, however, it is appropriate to presume that the case warrants
disbarment

The district court correctly reached this conclusion, but then

undercut the seriousness of the misconduct and reduced the disbarment to a
three-year suspension, with all but 181 days stayed. The OPC's contention on
appeal is that the district court did i lot 1 1a1 /e tl le discretioi i to r edi ice the sanctioi i
in this case.
B.
Iaken in the Light Post Favorable to Grimes, the Evidence
Presented to the District Court was Insufficient to Justify a Departure
From Disbarment
1-

The Mitigation Presented Was Not Truly Compelling

The district court heard evidence regarding factors of mitigation and
aggravatior i if i ordei tc read i tl le • i iltimate saiidi< ni

Grimes «>(MH IIJI 1 was

intentional misappropriation, requiring disbarment absent truly compelling
r II litigatioi i„ I I lere was i IO evidei ice pi eser ited at tl iat Sanctions Hearing that this
Court would consider truly compelling mitigation.
This Court has articulated that in attorney discipline cases involving
n tisappropi iation, the sanctioi i i : >1 ' disbarmt -

nggered even without the

cumulative effect of other Rule violations1. In re Ennenga, 2001 UT 111, P10.

1

Grimes violated several of the Rules of Professional Conduct, but, as this Court
has opined in similar cases, the Rule violations involving misappropriation are
sufficient to presume disbarment without considering other Rules the attorney
may have violated.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Once that sanction is triggered, in order to overcome the "presumption of
disbarment, 'the aggravating and mitigating factors must be significant.' In fact,
they must be 'truly compelling.'" Id,, quoting In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, at 1237
and In re Babilis, 951 P.2d at 217, respectively. In this case Grimes failed to
present any evidence that could properly be classified as compelling mitigation
for his actions.
Grimes offered evidence to support several factors of mitigation under
Rule 14-607(b) of the Standards. The district court concluded that the following
factors applied to this case: 1) the absence of a record of prior discipline; 2)
inexperience in the practice of law; 3) personal and emotional problems; 4) good
character or reputation; 5) interim reform; and 6) remorse.2 R. 339-341. These
factors do not constitute truly compelling mitigation.
Serious misconduct is not easily mitigated. See e.g. In re Brewster, 587
A.2d 1067 (Del 1991) (mitigating factors including sincere, deep regret and
attempt to rectify consequences did not overcome attorney's failure to maintain
personal integrity by engaging in serious criminal conduct resulting in conviction
for bank fraud).

The Supreme Court of Iowa has noted that although its

sympathy is frequently aroused by attorneys' personal problems, "protection of
the public interest prevents us from being swayed by them." See Iowa Supreme

2

Though the district court found that remorse was a factor in mitigation, the court
tempered that finding by stating: "It is clear from the evidence that remorse and
restitution have not been at the forefront of Mr. Grimes' actions. He has yet to
make any for of repayment to Mr. Riordan. He has admitted that he believes he
owes Mr. Riordan $7,070 plus interest." R. 340-341. With that said, remorse
certainly could not have been a truly compelling factor of mitigation.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

Court. Bd. i )f Pi of. Ethics and Conduct v. Sunleaf, 588 N.W.2d 126, 127 (Iowa
1999). Further,
Nearly every lawyer involved in these cases could cite personal
problems as the cause of the professional downfall. But life in
general is a series of problems and it is the fundamental purpose of
our profession to face and solve them. Our profession certainly
cannot excuse misconduct on the basis of personal problems.
Id. (quoting Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Cook, 409 N.W.2d
469, 470 (Iowa 1987)).
The factors of mitigation Grimes presented to the? district court do not
establish the kind of truly compelling mitigation that this Court has stated are
necessary to reduce a presumptive disbarment in a misappropriation case down
to a lesser sanction. Grimes' misappropriated $7,070.00 from his client. It is true
that he was new to the practice of law, and that he did not have a previous record
of discipline. For matter's dealh ig wit! i cliei it fi n ids, tl lose factors of mitigation are
not significant. It does not take substantial experience in the practice of law to
know that you are not entitled to take a client's money. 1 1 lat type ol " I ;i lowing,
dishonest misconduct is not something an attorney learns to avoid through
practice and experience. Further, that an attorney hasn't engaged in misconduct
previously does not

*• • urst iristance of misappropriation should be

looked at in a more favorable light. Misappropriation is the most serious of all
attorney d«M i|»lmo niRtl«jo , ood I*"1 ibsonce of a |nIOI u»i oid <>t discipline should
not rise to the level of compelling, or even significant, mitigation.
On the issue of Grimes' emotion problems, the district court found: "Mr.
Grimes, family members and otl lei s testified os lo IIio emotional pt'obloms Mr.
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Grimes was facing during the initial period of this incident, including his own
depression coupled with the hospitalization if his infant child." R. at 340. Again,
this finding of mitigation does not rise to the level of truly compelling. In the
Ennenga case, the Court was presented with an attorney who also offered
emotional problems as a factor of mitigation. In re Ennenga, 2001 UT 111 at If 14.
Ennenga had asserted that his personal and emotional problems, stemming from
his inability to meet his own financial obligations, had led him to take client
money. Id. This Court stated that:
Although we understand that the pressure of not being able to meet one's
financial obligations can be great, we cannot condone the taking of a
client's money to resolve that problem, even with the intent to return their
funds. Personal financial pressures cannot mitigate the offense of
misappropriation. See In re Blumenstyk, 152 N.J. 158, 704 A.2d 1, 4 (N.J.
1997) ("Family financial pressures cannot excuse an attorney's ethical
dereliction.")
Id.
The emotional problems Grimes presented are unfortunate, but do not constitute
truly compelling mitigation. They cannot be considered an important factor that
would reduce the proper sanction of disbarment in this case.
The remaining two factors, that Grimes displayed interim reform and a
good reputation, also do not rise to the level of truly compelling mitigation. Like
the absence of a prior record and inexperience in the practice of law, a good
reputation and interim reform can mitigate less serious misconduct such as
diligence, or a lack of adequate communication with a client. They are not factors
which rise to the level of truly compelling mitigation, and should not be used to
depart from disbarment in a misappropriation case.
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The mitigation Grimes' offered is not truly compelling. Because that is the
requirement for a district court when a presumptive disbarment is reduced in a.
misappropriatioi i case, tl le 01 }C wai ited to addi ess tl ie mitigation that was
presented to the district court. The district court detailed that mitigation, but it did
not necessarily use any of it as tl ie i easoi i it lessei led Gi ii nes" sai ictioi i. h istead,
the district court relied upon this Court's decision in In re Discipline of Crawley,
2007 UT 44 (2007) to reduce the presumptive disbarment. The OPC disagrees
that the Crawley decision allows a district court such flexibility in cases of
misappropriation.
2.

Crawley is Not Applicable to Misappropriation Cases

The district court cited this Court's decision in Crawley m its i nder of
Sanction

;

i. The district court quoted Crawley, and stated that the guidance

provided by this Court regarding a "triangle of justice, protection and
rehabilitatioi i" was appropriate to i ise ii i tl lis case Id t eferring to Crawley 2007
UT 44, fl 22, 23. Crawley was not a misappropriation case, and the Court's
guidance in that matter is not correctly applicable ID misappropriation casi :s
Stevei i Crawley ("Ci awley") violated Ri lies I I (Competence); 1.2(a)
(Scope of Represenation); 1.3 (Diligence); 1.4(a) (Communication); and, 8.4 (a)
and (c) (Misconduct) --J- was suspended by the distort < ouri HIP distnct « mirt
stayed the suspension and placed him on probation, and the OPC appealed to
this Court concerning the district court's use of probation. Crawley, 2007 1 11 44, i|
7. i '3wie- - lisconduct did not iHate to client funds or misappropriation.
Essentially, he failed to communicate with his firm and his client about his failures
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to diligently pursue his client's cases, and, ultimately misrepresented to them the
true nature of the underlying actions. Id. at fl 3-5. The OPC appealed the district
court's decision to stay the suspension he received, as we did not believe
probation was appropriate given the dishonest elements of his misconduct. This
Court disagreed and affirmed the district court's use of probation. Id. at ^ 25.
This Court's analysis and guidance in the Crawley case is applicable to
attorney discipline cases which do not involve presumptive disbarments for
misappropriation. It was not correctly used by the district court to reduce Grimes'
presumptive disbarment. The "truly compelling mitigation" standard is the only
standard that this Court has recognized in cases of misappropriation. See In re
Ennenga, 2001 UT 111 (2001); In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1998); and, In re
Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997).
The district court cited the following section of Crawley in its Order of
Sanction: "... we note that the imposition of probation with the right conditions
may in some cases be more protective of the public than a period of suspension."
R. 341, quoting Crawley 2007 UT 44, fl 23. The basis for this Court's statement
was that in some cases a district court may craft a probationary period with
attorney-specific terms that allows the attorney to change their ways, and protects
the public from the attorney's future misconduct. Id. When the district court
presented its ruling to the OPC and Grimes on February 4, 2011, the court stated:
"Mr. Grimes, I spent a lot of time thinking about this case. I'm giving you an
unbelievable chance to redeem yourself." R. 352 at pg. 9. The court's apparent
sympathy for Grimes' does not, however, mean that it was proper to go outside
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this Court's case law and guidance regarding disbarments for misappropriation
cases. The district court did not find that there was truly compelling mitigation,
and incniriecli / applied lh<

CMW/H

.isc to much more serious attorney

misconduct to reduce a presumptive disbarment to suspension and probation.
The Oi~ •" "moc this Coi JI t to reverse tl lat decisioi i ai id ei itei at i Oi dei of
disbarment against Grimes.
CONCLUSION
Grimes misappropriated client funds. I his "'' nuil has hcon deai Illhal the
sanction foi that misconduct is disbarment, absent truly compelling mitigation.
Grimes did not present such mitigation, but the district court still reduced the
sanctior i to a suspension t Tl ie Crawley decision does not change this Court's
guidance in misappropriation cases, and the district court erred in using it as a
basis foi the sanctioi \ reduction The OPO asks this Court to reverse fhf* district
court and enter an Order of disbarment against Grimes for his serious
misconduct.
DATED: June

C~

•

,2011.

Orr-ICl: OhPR* )KE.SSI(.)NAL CONDI J I

^^V^^
Adam C. Bevis
Assistant Counsel
Billy L Walker
Senior Counsel
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Rules of Central Importance Cited In the Brief
Rule 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between
Client and Lawyer)
(a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer
may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out
the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a
matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial
and whether the client will testify.
(b) A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment,
does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or
moral views or activities.
(c) A lawyer may limit the scope of tl\e representation if the limitation is
reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the
legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may
counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity,
scope, meaning or application of the law.
! : .- • • 1 3 (Diligei ice)

A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client.
Rule 1.4 (Communication)
(a) A lawyer shall 1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance
with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is
required by these Rules; 2) reasonably consult with the client about the means
by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished; 3) keep the client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter; 4) promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information; and 5) consult with the client about any
relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client
expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law."
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
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Rule 1.5 (Fees)
(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge or collect an unreasonable
fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following 1) the time and
labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly; 2) the likelihood, if apparent to the
client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other
employment by the lawyer; 3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for
similar legal services; 4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 5) the
time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 6) the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client; 7) the experience,
reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and 8)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses
for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client,
preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the
representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client
on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or
expenses shall also be communicated to the client.
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is
rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph
(d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the
client and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including
the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of
settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the
recovery; and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the
contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly notify the client of any
expenses for which the client will be liable whether or not the client is the
prevailing party. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall
provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and,
if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its
determination.
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge or collect: 1) any fee
in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent
upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or
property settlement in lieu thereof; or 2) a contingent fee for representing a
defendant in a criminal case.
(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be
made only if: 1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each
lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; 2) the
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client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive,
and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and 3) the total fee is reasonable.
Rule 8.4 (Misconduct)
(a) It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the
Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do
so through the acts of another.
(b) It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that reflects
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects.
(c) It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage it i coi lduct inn rolving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
(d) "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(e) It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to state or imply an ability to
influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by
means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.
(f) It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to knowingly assist a judge or judicial
officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other
law.
Rule 14-603. Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
(a) Scope. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or
acknowledgement that the lawyer has engaged in professional misconduct.
(b) Disbarment. Disbarment terminates the individual's status as a lawyer. A
lawyer who has been disbarred may be readmitted as provided in Rule 14-525.
(c) Suspension. Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law
for a specified minimum period of time. Generally, suspension should be
imposed for a specific period of time equal to or greater than six months, but in
no event should the time period prior to application for reinstatement be more
than three years.
(c)(1) A lawyer who has been suspended for six months or less may be
reinstated as set forth in Rule 14-524.
(c)(2) A lawyer who has been suspended for more than six months may
be reinstated as set forth in Rule 14-525.
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(d) Interim suspension. Interim suspension is the temporary suspension of a
lawyer from the practice of law. Interim suspension may be imposed as set forth
in Rules 14-518 and 14-519.
(e) Reprimand. Reprimand is public discipline which declares the conduct of the
lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice.
(f) Admonition. Admonition is nonpublic discipline which declares the conduct of
the lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice.
(g) Probation. Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under
specified conditions. Probation can be public or nonpublic, can be imposed alone
or in conjunction with other sanctions, and can be imposed as a condition of
readmission or reinstatement.
(h) Resignation with discipline pending. Resignation with discipline pending is a
form of public discipline which allows a respondent to resign from the practice of
law while either an informal or formal complaint is pending against the
respondent. Resignation with discipline pending may be imposed as set forth in
Rule 14-521.
(i) Other sanctions and remedies. Other sanctions and remedies which may be
imposed include:
(i)(1) restitution;
(i)(2) assessment of costs;
(i)(3) limitation upon practice;
(i)(4) appointment of a receiver;
(i)(5) a requirement that the lawyer take the Bar Examination or
professional responsibility examination; and
(i)(6) a requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education courses.
(j) Reciprocal discipline. Reciprocal discipline is the imposition of a disciplinary
sanction on a lawyer who has been disciplined in another court, another
jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction.
Rule 14-604. Factors to be Considered in Imposing Sanctions, Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanction after a finding
of lawyer misconduct:
(a) the duty violated;
(b) the lawyer's mental state;
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.
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Rule 14-605. Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions.
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors
set out in Rule 14-604, the following sanctions are generally appropriate.
(a) Disbarment. Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to
benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes serious
or potentially serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or
causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding;
or
(a)(2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which
includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or
the sale, distribution, or importation of controlled substances; or the
intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of
another to commit any of these offenses; or
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the
lawyer's fitness to practice law.
(b) Suspension. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(b)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes
injury or potential injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or
causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b)(2) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements
listed in Rule 14-605(a)(2) but nevertheless seriously adversely reflects on
the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
(c) Reprimand. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(c)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes
injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference
with a legal proceeding; or
(c)(2) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's
fitness to practice law.
(d) Admonition. Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(d)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes little
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or no injury to a party, the public, or the legal system or interference with a
legal proceeding, but exposes a party, the public, or the legal system to
potential injury or causes potential interference with a legal proceeding; or
(d)(2) engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise identified in
this rule that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
Rule 14-607. Aggravation and Mitigation, Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions.
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating
circumstances may be considered and weighed in deciding what sanction to
impose.
(a) Aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances are any
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline
to be imposed. Aggravating circumstances may include:
(a)(1) prior record of discipline;
(a)(2) dishonest or selfish motive;
(a)(3) a pattern of misconduct;
(a)(4) multiple offenses;
(a)(5) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to
comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority;
(a)(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive
practices during the disciplinary process;
(a)(7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct
involved, either to the client or to the disciplinary authority;
(a)(8) vulnerability of victim;
(a)(9) substantial experience in the practice of law;
(a)(10) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of the misconduct involved; and
(a)(11) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances.
(b) Mitigating circumstances. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or
factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed.
Mitigating circumstances may include:
(b)(1) absence of a prior record of discipline;
(b)(2) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(b)(3) personal or emotional problems;
(b)(4) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of the misconduct involved;
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(b)(5) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior
to the discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings;
(b)(6) inexperience in the practice of law;
(b)(7) good character or reputation;
(b)(8) physical disability;
(b)(9) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
(b)(9)(A) the respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental
disability; and
(b)(9)(B) the substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to
the misconduct; and
(b)(9)(C) the respondents recovery from the substance abuse or mental
disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of
successful rehabilitation; and
(b)(9)(D) the recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that
misconduct is unlikely;
(b)(10) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided that the
respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided
further that the respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the
delay;
(b)(11) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability or
impairment;
(b)(12) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
(b)(13) remorse; and
(b)(14) remoteness of prior offenses.
(c) Other circumstances. The following circumstances should not be considered
as either aggravating or mitigating:
(c)(1) forced or compelled restitution;
(c)(2) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;
(c)(3) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings;
(c)(4) complainant's recommendation as to sanction; and
(c)(5) failure of injured client to complain.
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